Francisco Castañeda
Economista Usach
Es cierto que un alza del salario mínimo en forma desmesurada podría agravar la situación de contracción que exhibe la economía chilena. Ya ocurrió en el pasado con el reajuste trianual del salario mínimo (en la crisis asiática). Pero indudablemente existe poder adquisitivo perdido a causa de una alta inflación en el año pasado, el cual debe ser recompuesto para estos grupos vulnerables. Si bien es cierto que el salario mínimo es en parte! el efecto de un sistema educativo que no forma para la vida laboral, la coyuntura actual presenta ventajas y costos. No existen presiones inflacionarias significativas, y el consumo y la demanda interna decrecen. Todo el incremento de salario mínimo (inflación esperada + productividad) se gasta en la economía, fortaleciendo las ventas de las empresas. A su vez la proporción de la fuerza empleada que recibe el salario mínimo es muy baja (15% aprox.). En cuanto a la medición de la productividad, esta es subjetiva. Parte de la productividad de muchas empresas, esta basada en este apalancamiento en mano de obra barata. El reajuste del salario mínimo en un nivel razonable (no más del 4%-5%) devuelve parte de esta "productividad" a estos grupos de trabajadores. Claro esta que con este incremento, nadie dejará de formarse profesionalmente. Las razones para ello radican en el acceso ("inclusión) y en el costo, especialmente para los deciles más pobres. La discusión es más profunda que sólo un tema de productividad.
The global financial crisis has represented a great blow to affiliates of private pension systems throughout the world and the Argentine government even nationalized its private system to "rescue" affiliates' savings. Chile was the first country in the world to introduce a private pension system (the AFP system) and it has been a model for other Latin American countries and also in other parts of the world.
BNamericas spoke with Francisco Castañeda, finance professor at Universidad de Santiago, about the damage that Chile's AFP system has suffered from the crisis and what lies ahead for the AFP system and its affiliates.
BNamericas: You could say that Chile's AFP system was performing quite well in terms of profitability until the global crisis placed the entire system in doubt - to such a degree that Argentina went to the extreme of nationalizing its system. How badly has the global crisis damaged the credibility of Chile's AFP system in the eyes of its affiliates?
Castañeda: There is no doubt that the credibility of Chile's AFP system has been damaged. Markets collapsed so quickly that years of savings evaporated. The world hadn't stopped growing in the past 40 years and the system was created with that positive aspect in mind. The fees that affiliates pay to the private pension fund managers [AFPs] have not been reduced and therefore many affiliates feel that the cost of the crisis is not being shared.
BNamericas: How long - how many years, actually - do you think it will take for the system to bounce back to pre-crisis levels in terms of the value of the assets that AFPs manage?
Castañeda: Pension fund values fell 18% in a 12-month period to February 2009. Capital losses - on the domestic market and foreign markets - came to approximately US$17bn, or some 10% of Chile's GDP, in 12 months.
The A and B funds that invest more in shares accumulated losses in 12 months that range from 28% to 40%. If companies listed on the stock market would see returns of 8% - which is a very cautious ratio given the magnitude of the crisis - we would have to wait at least 4-5 years to see the same equity levels that we saw before the subprime crisis. We would also have to wait for definitive results from the Obama plan that is aimed at jumpstarting the North American economy.
BNamericas: Do you feel that the sharp criticism of the AFPs since the onset of the crisis has been fair?
Castañeda: It's the result of inserting a pension model within an earnings/losses capital scheme and this time we are looking at the less friendly side of the pension system. The AFPs could have done more to moderate affiliates' payments during periods when the crisis had a larger effect on fund performance.
BNamericas: What do you think about the attitude of the AFP association that has announced it is willing to see changes to the system but frequently complains to the media that they need to see "serious" proposals?
Castañeda: I think that changes are inevitably aimed at introducing more competition into the system. But however it's measured, the AFP industry's own profitability is still considered very high. It's true that the industry has very strong economies of scale but they don't always work to the benefit of "price" for their affiliates.
BNamericas: What lessons could the AFPs learn from the global crisis and what lessons can affiliates take away?
Castañeda: I think the crisis opens an excellent debate about how to improve support for affiliates, especially from the lower-income bracket. A bill that would authorize banks to form AFP subsidiaries has been slowed down, because of resistance from state-owned Banco Estado. However, one alternative is for the treasury to guarantee levels of profitability for lower-income affiliates or individuals who are averse to risk. There is a minimum pension requirement but I'm speaking about middle-aged people who aren't too young or too old who could enter volatile funds with a lot of shares and invest in a state fund that guarantees them steady capital earnings. Older people could also participate in this type of fund.
This option could be developed through social security agency INP, which could reduce the current levels of fees that the industry charges for managing the pension funds. This could be managed in the same way as the central bank's international reserves or some other entity that can guarantee low risk. The concept is that the state can't wash its hands of its pension responsibilities to the low-income bracket. Because these resources are vital later in life, any reduction throws thousands of people into poverty or makes them poorer.
But it's important to point out that fund profitability will be very low because of the low risk assumed.
It's undeniable that the crisis has had such an impact that neither specialists nor experts have been able to avoid losses in their pension savings. It's necessary to protect the segments of the population where pension awarness is low and there are already tools to help in that area, such as not allowing affiliates who are near retirement to switch to the riskiest A fund.
BNamericas: A major pension reform by President Bachelet's administration gave AFPs a lot more room to invest abroad, through gradual increases. Do you think that the AFPs are going to make full use of this space in the years to come or are they going to be more cautious about investing outside of Chile in the wake of the uncertainty left by the crisis?
Castañeda: AFPs are always going to face a trade-off when deciding whether to invest in the domestic market or in foreign stock markets. Although the local stock exchange has a high market capitalization in terms of GDP, the figure is very low compared to the investment needs of the AFPs, which manage resources equivalent to 50% of GDP.
The crisis has highlighted the fact that the major crashes have taken place on stock exchanges in developed nations, but it has contaminated emerging market economies. In this stage of the crisis, where the market crashes have been considerable, there isn't a lot of room for restructuring investment portfolios.
BNamericas: Presidential elections are coming up in Chile. One of the largest and most enduring legacies of Bachelet's administration will definitely be the historic pension reform. Do you think that the next president - regardless of party - will continue reforming the AFP system and, if so, what sort of reforms can we expect?
Castañeda: If the center-right candidate wins [Sebastián Piñera], one major change that we can expect is that private capital will be channeled from the AFPs to state mining firm Codelco. This would involve improving corporate governance at state companies since they would be receiving investment contributions from AFPs.
If the center-left candidate wins [Eduardo Frei], I foresee more changes to the regulatory scheme along with strengthening the "solidarity pillar". Improvements to corporate governance will also follow along the lines of regulating conflicts of interest with capital markets and making that issue more transparent. When financial intermediaries share property, it's inevitable that decision-making must be transparent, especially when dealing with a large base of minority shareholders such as in the case with the AFPs.
One proposed reform is to incorporate the armed forces into the current pension system. The fact that they're being managed under the old system is causing a very large deficit for the country, besides the fact that it's unfair to the majority of Chileans who pay into the AFP system.
The ideas from either presidential candidate involve more risk but there has to be a balance between what the capital market needs in terms of conditions for normal operations (liquidity for financing companies, overseas investments, etc.) and the needs of workers paying pension - especially people from the middle and lower-income brackets and people who finance themselves with that investment equation. Their pension cannot be worn down by high fees in an environment where multifunds perform negatively over a long period of time. In the long term, the system's profitability is positive - adjusted according to fees, but there must be some innovation in terms of investment rules and the definition of the social base for this system.
BNamericas: Do you believe that one day we will see the much talked about state-run AFP? The project has been delayed much longer than expected and there is still no clarity on that issue.
Castañeda: We are definitely going to see that competition doesn't work for everything in the market and that has potential to manifest in certain collusive oligarchic political practices, like the low variability of fees in the AFP industry. Public policies exist in order to guarantee competition. When that doesn't happen naturally, it's the authorities' responsibility to introduce more competition into the system, and that way reduce the fees that affiliates must pay. The issue could be handled more closely by authorizing banks - including state bank BancoEstado and using all of the necessary shelters - to offer the services that pension fund managers can offer.
At the same time, the authorities could assure individuals who are averse to risk of low but positive profitability when concerning their fund management. This would help improve the market in the "misinformed/low income" segment. Fund E does fulfill this role but it is still variable and the fee structure is complicated. The nature of this crisis and the duration of the downturn is such that it calls for markets to be complemented with a special instrument for those types of beneficiaries who need security with their pension funds. Perhaps through the INP, that would invest in managing international reserves from the central bank or another entity in a way that would ensure low risk.
BIOGRAPHY
Castañeda is an economist from Universidad de Santiago de Chile and is currently undertaking a PhD in economic geography at Loughborough University (UK). He also holds a masters in economy and finance, from University of Birmingham (UK), and a business administration degree from Universidad de Chile. His areas of research are: corporate finance, industrial organization and macroeconomics.
ABOUT THE COMPANY
Founded in 1849, state-owned Universidad de Santiago is one of Chile's oldest universities with seven departments and over 18,000 students.
El profesor Luis Leyton opina sobre "Retail, Crisis Económica y el 'Síndrome de los Remeros' ", en la edición de abril – mayo de la Revista LEA Magazine Liderazgo, Estrategia y Actualidad Empresarial. Para leer publicación pinche aquí.
Francisco Castañeda
Economista Usach
Las tasas de interés largas en la economía chilena han evidenciado un alza notoria, tanto en papeles BCU (en UF) como BCP (en pesos) en su tramo sobre los 5 años (5,6% y 2,7% respectivamente). La inconveniencia radica en que estas son variables claves para valorizar inversiones (léase mas allá de 5 años), de mediano y largo plazo. Si es bien cierto que las tasas de interés de mercado de corto plazo han mostrado una resistencia a la baja a las reducciones consecutivas de la tasa de política monetaria del Banco Central, las tasas largas muestran una variación opuesta.
El relajamiento cuantitativo a la chilena (dejar de emitir bonos, o financiar el déficit fiscal con emisiones de bonos soberanos en el extranjero) se acerca inevitablemente, si es que la actividad no despega, y así contribuir a poner presión sobre las tasas largas, si es que estas se mantienen en niveles altos.
En relación al primaje por riesgo con el que opera la banca privada, este es aún desproporcionado respecto a las significativas caídas de su costo de fondo (la tasa de instancia ha bajado 6,25%!! en los últimos meses). Aunque esta no es una relación lineal, la banca no puede apuntar en periodo de crisis a la mantención de una "tasa de interés relativamente constante" (la tasa de interés a publico ajustada por el menor costo de fondo). Esto podría estar bloqueando al segmento PYME de acceder a menores tasas de interés, segmento el cual ya opera con tasas de interés nominales para créditos sobre el 2% y 2,5% mensuales, comiéndose el margen productivo de su negocio el relativo alto spread financiero bancario.
Hay que destacar que el empeoramiento de la calidad de la cartera bancaria (muy bajo aún) ocurrió en el período de laxitud previo a la crisis internacional. Por tanto, no pueden las actuales empresas PYMEs y las no tan pequeñas, "pagar" por la mantención de una determinada rentabilidad de cartera crediticia, valorada a los mayores niveles de riesgo de crédito ex-post. Opera inevitablemente el "efecto lemons", y la calidad de las carteras crediticias puede empeorar aún más porque los costos de salida ("buscarse otro banco") de este tipo de empresas son altos, y tienen que aceptar "las condiciones del mercado".
El Plan Pro Crédito del Ministerio de Hacienda, que flexibiliza reglamentos a las Cajas de Compensación y Compañías de Seguros, para poder competir con la oferta crediticia bancaria, es bastante bajo en magnitud respecto al total de stock crediticio de la economía (sólo un 3%), pero es un paso en la dirección correcta. El riesgo, sin embargo, es que la economía se ha ralentizado a una velocidad mayor que los buenos fundamentos que esta exhibe, y la banca no ha actuado en concordancia con la magnitud de la crisis, atrasando innecesariamente el apalancamiento de riesgos que requiere el sistema productivo.
Francisco Castañeda
Académico Usach
Son discutibles los comentarios de algunos analistas respecto a que la industria farmacéutica presentaría bajas utilidades y por lo tanto bajos márgenes (un bajo EBIT). Señalan además que la colusión en esta industria no ha causado daño a los consumidores, y que respondería a un período de recuperación de precios, luego de una guerra de precios entre los actores del mercado. Sin embargo, esta surgiendo una información que de comprobarse, vuelve todo más complejo: las supuestas asesorías de Directores de las Farmacias a sus mismas empresas con un costo equivalente al 50% de las utilidades. Si es así, esto tiene como objetivo simular costos más altos que el real, imposibilitando un análisis más certero de estas prácticas anti-mercado. La estructura de los gobiernos corporativos en Chile es tan concentrada que estas prácticas se vuelven comunes, dañando a los accionistas minoritarios, entre ellos las AFPs, y la jubilación a futuro de los ya defraudados-consumidores. Todo esto daña la confianza en el mercado bursátil, resiente la liquidez y el financiamiento de las empresas, y lo hace menos atractivo para la inversión extranjera en la bolsa. Es hora de la regulación para hacer el mercado más transparente.